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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Brock v. Wendell's Woodwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1989),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the free exercise clause of the first amendment exempted members
of the Shiloh True Light Church of Christ (the Church), a separatist religious
sect, and their children's employers from the requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. sections 201-219 (1982) (the child labor
laws). The child labor laws prohibit the employment of children ages
fourteen and under. According to the Secretary of Labor, the defendants,
Wendell's Woodwork, Inc. and McGee Brothers Company, employed children as young as nine and ten years old.
The controlling officers of Wendell's Woodwork, Inc. and four of the
five owners of McGee Brothers Company were members of the Church.
The Church members believed in a home teaching program supplemented
with vocational training. As part of this training program, the defendants
employed children of Church members to perform a variety of jobs including
operating power equipment and laying brick and cinderblock.
Alleging that the defendants' actions violated the child labor laws, the
Secretary of Labor brought an action seeking to enjoin the defendants from
employing children in the vocational training program. In response, the
defendants contended that the free exercise clause of the first amendment
exempted the defendants from the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina granted the Secretary of Labor's motion in limine to prevent the
introduction of evidence supporting the defendants' free exercise argument.
Consequently, the court held that the religious rights of Church members
did not bar the Secretary of Labor's enforcement of the labor laws. On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the
defendants conceded that the wage-hour provisions applied, but argued that
application of the minimum age requirement was unconstitutional.
To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit compared the burden of child
labor laws on the defendants' religious interest with the strength of the
government's interest in enforcing child labor laws. The court noted that
the United States Supreme Court used this balancing test in Tony & Susan
Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985), to resolve
a similar conflict between labor laws and free exercise rights. In Alamo the
defendant, the Alamo Foundation, rehabilitated drug addicts by employing
them in commercial enterprises. The Alamo Foundation did not pay the
addicts wages, but did provide the addicts with various necessities, including
food and lodging. The Supreme Court, finding that the government's interest
in enforcing the wage-hour laws outweighed the burden of the wage-hour
laws on the defendant's religious interest, held that the wage-hour laws were
constitutionally applicable.
The Fourth Circuit analyzed the case at bar using the balancing test
that the Supreme Court set forth in Alamo. Citing Prince v. Massachusetts,
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321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944), in which the Supreme Court explained that child
employment is an area particularly appropriate for broad state regulation,
the Fourth Circuit explained that the government has a substantial interest
in regulating child labor. Furthermore, the court noted that commercial
enterprises that compete with the defendants have a legitimate interest in
the uniform application of child labor laws. Accordingly, the court found
that the government's interest in the enforcement of child labor laws
outweighed the burden of child labor laws on the defendant's religious
interest. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the decision of the district
court.
In Martin v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1988), the Fourth Circuit
considered whether, by using a single incident as a basis for convicting a
defendant of both vandalism and attempted breaking and entering with the
intent to commit larceny, a state had violated a criminal defendant's fifth
amendment double jeopardy rights. In Martin the Commonwealth of Virginia (the Commonwealth) prosecuted petitioner Melvin W. Martin for
misdemeanor vandalism. The Commonwealth based the vandalism charge
on the allegation that Martin had broken the glass door of a gas station
cashier's booth while the gas station was closed for the night. The Commonwealth claimed that Martin's action violated VA. CODE ANN. section
18.2-137 (1988), which provides that a person who unlawfully damages or
destroys property not the person's own commits a misdemeanor. Subsequently, based on the Commonwealth's allegation, the General District
Court for the City of Buena Vista convicted Martin of misdemeanor
vandalism.
In addition to the misdemeanor claim, the Commonwealth in a later
trial tried Martin for the felony of attempted breaking and entering with
the intent to commit larceny. The Commonwealth based this second charge
on the same nighttime incident that led to Martin's vandalism conviction.
The Commonwealth argued that evidence showing that Martin had the
specific intent to commit larceny and that he carried out some overt act
tending towards, but falling short of, the consummation of his intended
crime was sufficient to establish that Martin had committed attempted
breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny. Accordingly, the
Commonwealth argued that Martin's testimony about his intent to obtain
a match from the station proved Martin's specific intent to steal a match
from the station, and that Martin's breaking of the glass constituted Martin's
commission of an overt act tending towards, but falling short of, the
consummation of larceny. The Circuit Court for the City of Buena Vista,
the Virginia state court that held Martin's second trial, agreed with this
rationale and, therefore, convicted Martin of attempted breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny.
As a result of his two state-court convictions, Martin filed in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Martin alleged that by twice putting him in jeopardy
for the same offense the Commonwealth violated his fifth amendment
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rights. The district court held that for purposes of a double jeopardy
analysis the offenses of vandalism and attempted breaking and entering
with the intent to commit larceny were not the same offense. Therefore,
the district court denied Martin's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Martin appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, alleging that, because the same evidence
that the Commonwealth used to convict Martin of misdemeanor vandalism
also was necessary to establish that Martin committed breaking and entering
with the intent to commit larceny, the Commonwealth had violated Martin's
double jeopardy rights. In considering Martin's appeal, the Fourth Circuit
noted Jordan v. Virginia, 653 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1980). In Jordan the
Fourth Circuit held that the government violates a person's double jeopardy
rights if, in successively trying the person for the same incident, the evidence
that the government necessarily uses to obtain a conviction at the first trial
also is sufficient evidence to establish an offense charged at the second
trial.
Applying the Jordan analysis to the facts in Martin, the Fourth Circuit
first noted the absence of any record of Martin's vandalism trial. Because
of this absence, the court assumed both that the Commonwealth's proof at
the vandalism trial had followed the charge and that the vandalism offense
was the only offense charged or tried. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the only evidence which the Commonwealth necessarily must have
presented at the vandalism trial was the evidence that Martin had shattered
the glass. Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that only the shattered glass
evidence was relevant to the Jordan double jeopardy analysis.
Having determined that only the shattered glass evidence was relevant
to the double jeopardy analysis, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the
evidence that Martin shattered the glass was necessary to establish attempted
breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny, the offense charged
at the second trial. The Fourth Circuit noted that under VA. CODE ANN.
sections 18.2-90 and 18.2-91 (1988) an unlawful entering done during the
nighttime, even if not accompanied by a breaking, is sufficient to establish
the elements of the underlying felony of breaking and entering. Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, to establish the elements of attempted
breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny, the Commonwealth
did not have to prove that Martin actually broke the glass. The Fourth
Circuit next noted that an attempted crime consists of a specific intent and
an overt act. The Fourth Circuit further stated that the Commonwealth
could have established Martin's commission of an overt act in any of several
ways other than by reference to Martin's shattering of the glass. The Fourth
Circuit observed that at the trial the Commonwealth put on evidence showing
that, during the incident at the gas station, Martin approached the booth,
pushed and pulled the sliding glass window, and placed his hand in the
opening that the shattered glass created. The appellate court concluded that
any one of these three actions by Martin may have sufficed to satisfy the
overt conduct component of the attempt crime. In addition, the Fourth
Circuit found that Martin's testimony that he intended to steal from the
gas station established the specific intent component.
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Consequently, the Fourth Circuit decided that, to obtain Martin's
conviction for attempted breaking and entering with the intent to commit
larceny, the Commonwealth did not necessarily have to rely on the evidence
of Martin's breaking of the glass. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held
that, because the evidence necessary for Martin's vandalism conviction was
not necessary to establish that Martin committed breaking and entering with
the intent to commit larceny, the Commonwealth had not successively tried
Martin for the same offense so as to violate his double jeopardy rights.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Martin's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Circuit Judge Murnaghan dissented on the grounds that the majority
had not properly followed Jordan. Judge Murnaghan noted that, although
the Commonwealth in the felony trial did not need to rely on the evidence
that Martin broke the glass, the Commonwealth in fact had relied on that
evidence. Judge Murnaghan stated that the majority improperly had based
its analysis on the fact that the Commonwealth could have established the
same offense without any discussion of Martin's breaking of the glass.
Judge Murnaghan reasoned that a proper implementation of Jordan requires
the court to look at the evidence the Commonwealth actually presented and
not at the existence of other evidence that the Commonwealth might have
presented to achieve the same result. Judge Murnaghan noted that in Martin,
to prove that Martin engaged in an overt act tending toward the consummation of the crime of larceny, the Commonwealth admitted that it in fact
did rely on the evidence that Martin broke the glass. Thus, Judge Murnaghan
concluded that, because the Commonwealth actually used the same evidence
at both trials and that evidence was necessary to obtain the second conviction, the Commonwealth had violated Martin's double jeopardy rights.
In Shamblin's Ready Mix, Inc. v. Eaton Corp., 873 F.2d 736 (4th Cir.
1989), the Fourth Circuit considered whether an appellate court independently can modify a jury's award for punitive damages. In Shamblin's
Ready Mix the plaintiff, Shamblin's Ready Mix, Inc. (Shamblin), brought
a wrongful conversion action against Eaton Corporation (Eaton) and Eaton's
local distributor, Scott Equipment Company (Scott). According to the court,
Shamblin had purchased a pump and motor assembly from Eaton through
Scott. Subsequently, the equipment malfunctioned and Shamblin asked Scott
to replace the equipment. Scott originally offered to repair the equipment
at no charge, but later withdrew its offer because Shamblin continued to
insist on total replacement of the equipment. Shamblin then returned the
equipment to Scott and threatened to sue Eaton and Scott if they did not
replace the equipment.
After evaluating the equipment, Scott determined that the equipment
failure resulted from contamination and was not covered under the terms
of Eaton's warranty. To confirm this finding, Scott sent the equipment to
Eaton without Shamblin's permission or knowledge. After Scott informed
Shamblin that the warranty did not cover the equipment repair, Shamblin
renewed its threat to sue Scott and Eaton. Additionally, Shamblin demanded
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that Scott return the damaged equipment. Because Scott had transferred
the equipment to Eaton, Scott informed Shamblin that Scott was unable to
return the damaged equipment. Eaton refused to return the equipment
because Eaton wanted to maintain control of the equipment in anticipation
of litigation. Shamblin filed an action for conversion against Eaton and
Scott and then refused Eaton's subsequent offer to return the equipment.
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia the jury awarded Shamblin $3,531 in compensatory damages and
$600,000 in punitive damages under Shamblin's action for conversion. Eaton
appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, which held that, although punitive damages were allowable under
West Virginia law, the jury's award was excessive because Shamblin used
inadmissible evidence to mislead the jury. The court noted that although a
low-level Eaton employee had made an ad hoc decision to retain Shamblin's
equipment, Shamblin's closing argument misled the jury into believing that
Eaton maintained an ongoing policy of failing to return damaged equipment
to customers. As a result, the court set aside the punitive damage award
and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. On remand,
the jury awarded Shamblin $650,000 in punitive damages, and Eaton appealed the judgment for a second time to the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit again found that the punitive damage award was
excessive in light of Shamblin's misconduct at the trial level. The Fourth
Circuit noted that the punitive damage award exceeded the compensatory
damage award by a ratio of more than 184:1. This imbalance, the court
explained, appeared grossly excessive because Shamblin did not suffer any
personal injuries, business losses, or property damage from Eaton's actions.
In addition, the court noted that Eaton had offered to return the equipment
after Shamblin filed the complaint. Finally, the court found that the Eaton
employee responsible for the decision to retain the equipment did not act
with harmful or malicious intent. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, concluded
that, although a court should set aside a jury's damage award only under
exceptional circumstances, a miscarriage of justice would occur if the court
did not overturn the jury's punitive damages award.
After concluding that the jury's punitive damages award was excessive,
the court considered whether a jury would have to retry the punitive damage
award for a third time. Eaton and Scott petitioned the Fourth Circuit to
make an independent determination on the punitive damage award. Shamblin, however, contended that such an action by the appellate court would
violate the seventh amendment. While the Fourth Circuit found no specific
case law on whether a jury must determine a punitive damage award, the
court noted that in Kinnon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889), the United States
Supreme Court held that courts could not unilaterally modify compensatory
damage awards. The Fourth Circuit, however, distinguished Kinnon because
the Kinnon case involved compensatory damage awards and not punitive
damage awards. The Fourth Circuit explained that punitive damage awards
promote public welfare whereas compensatory damage awards punish private
wrongs.
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The Fourth Circuit compared Kinnon to Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412 (1987), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the seventh
amendment did not require a jury to determine the amount of the remedy
in actions involving civil penalties because such a determination was not a
"fundamental element of the trial." The Fourth Circuit explained that
punitive damages were analogous to civil penalties because both remedies
serve the public interest. The court, therefore, concluded that the Tull
holding was applicable to the case at bar. Applying the Tull rationale, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that, once a jury makes the initial determination
of liability, an appellate court independently can modify the amount of
punitive damages as a matter of law. In support of this conclusion, the
court noted that the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits also had
reduced punitive damage awards without discussion of whether the seventh
amendment was applicable. Additionally, the court explained that a policy
of appellate review of jury awards for punitive damages allows the appellate
court to balance fully all relevant circumstances justifying punishment of a
defendant.
After determining that the jury's punitive damage award was excessive
and that an appellate court independently may modify a jury's punitive
damage award, the Fourth Circuit reviewed Eaton's and Scott's conduct to
determine the appropriate amount of Shamblin's remedy. Based on Shamblin's lack of personal injury or property damage, Shamblin's use of
inadmissible evidence at trial, the Eaton officers' and directors' noninvolvement in the decision to retain the damaged equipment, and Eaton's and
Scott's lack of prior history of similar conduct, the Fourth Circuit held
that $60,000 in punitive damages was sufficient to punish Eaton for allowing
a low-level employee wrongfully to retain Shamblin's damaged equipment.
Accordingly, the court set aside the jury's punitive damage award and
entered judgment in Shamblin's favor in the amount of $60,000.
In Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth
Circuit considered whether a plaintiff could compel an employee of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Jack L. Downie, to testify in a
state court civil action with respect to information acquired during the
course of his official duties and against the specific instructions of his EPA
superiors. The state trial court, at the request of both parties, served Downie
with subpoenas to testify in a tort action about his investigation of an
alleged gasoline leak. The Regional Counsel for the EPA decided that
Downie's testimony was not in the interest of the EPA, prohibited Downie
from testifying, and moved to quash the subpoenas. The state trial court
denied the EPA's motion to quash the subpoenas and directed Downie to
testify. The EPA subsequently removed the subpoena proceedings to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1442(a) (1948).
The district court initially held that removal was proper and then
reviewed the EPA's decision to prohibit Downie's testimony. The district
court found that Downie's testimony was not subject to privilege, that it
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was essential to the administration of justice, that Downie was the most
knowledgeable and impartial source of information, and that testifying
would result only in minimal inconvenience to Downie and the EPA. To
reach its conclusion, the district court relied upon a "housekeeping" statute,
5 U.S.C. section 301 (1966), that permits an executive department head to
regulate the conduct of its employees but that does not authorize withholding
information from the public. The district court rejected the EPA's reliance
upon EPA regulations, which seek to ensure that an employee's official
time is used only for official purposes, because a department head cannot
claim a privilege to withhold information from the public. The district court
also rejected the EPA's defense of sovereign immunity because neither the
United States nor the EPA were named parties in the tort action.
The EPA appealed to the Fourth Circuit. The EPA argued that, in the
absence of a waiver of sovereign immunity, the EPA is not subject to
subpoenas that a state or local court issues in actions in which the EPA is
not a party. The EPA also argued that the subpoenas did not comply with
the internal EPA regulations concerning state court subpoenas, and therefore, the subpoenas should be quashed.
The Fourth Circuit began its discussion of the case by reviewing case
law recognizing the authority of agency heads to restrict testimony of their
subordinates. Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States ex
rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), and the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Swett v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986), the Fourth Circuit stated
that a federal employee may not be compelled to obey a subpoena contrary
to his federal employer's direction given under valid agency regulations.
According to the Fourth Circuit, prohibitions on such testimony conserve
resources and minimize governmental involvement in controversial matters
that are unrelated to official business.
The Fourth Circuit next addressed the EPA's claim that the state circuit
court and the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the subpoenas.
Finding that the jurisdiction of a federal court upon removal is derivative
of that of the state court, the Fourth Circuit decided that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity precluded the state court and, thus, the federal court
upon removal from exercising jurisdiction to compel Downie to testify.
Recognizing that the government was not a party to the underlying action,
the Fourth Circuit found that the nature of a subpoena proceeding is
inherently that of an action against the United States. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963), the court stated
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity would bar the subpoena proceedings
even though the subpoena proceedings are against a federal employee and
not against the government.
The Fourth Circuit went on to find that the principle of federal
supremacy reinforces the protection of sovereign immunity and prevents the
state court's attempt to override the EPA regulations. The state court's
action violated the Constitution's supremacy clause by asserting its power
of judicial review over federal agencies and by contradicting the agency's
duly enacted regulations that have the force and effect of federal law. Thus,
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the Fourth Circuit held in Downie that a state may not compel an EPA
employee to testify against the orders of a superior if the superior is acting
pursuant to duly promulgated regulations. The Fourth Circuit recognized
the current explosion in environmental litigation and stated that federal
agencies have valid and compelling interests in keeping their employees free
to conduct their official business without being targeted as potential witnesses in private civil actions.
In Foremost Guaranty Corp. v. Community Savings & Loan, Inc., 826
F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1987), the Fourth Circuit considered in an interlocutory
appeal whether the eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution
bars a declaratory judgment action against a savings and loan for which a
state agency functions as an appointed receiver. In Foremost Guaranty the
plaintiffs, Foremost Guaranty Corporation (Foremost) and United Guaranty
Residential Insurance Company (UGI), issued mortgage guarantee insurance
policies to EPIC Mortgage, Inc. (EMI), a subsidiary of Community Savings
and Loan, Inc. (Community). Subsequently, Foremost and UGI sought to
rescind the mortgage guaranty insurance policies, claiming that EMI used
fraud and misrepresentation to obtain the insurance policies. Thus, the
plaintiffs brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia a consolidated action against EMI and Community seeking a
declaratory judgment that would allow Foremost and UGI to rescind the
defendants' insurance policies. As a result of the plaintiffs' actions against
the defendants, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland,
appointed the Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund (MDIF) as conservator
and receiver of Community.
In response to the plaintiffs' allegations MDIF, as Community's receiver,
claimed that because MDIF, a state agency, acts both as an insurer of
deposits in Maryland-chartered savings and loans and as Community's
receiver, the State of Maryland was the real party in interest in the plaintiffs'
suit. Consequently, on the grounds that the eleventh amendment sovereign
immunity clause bars the plaintiffs from bringing an action in which the
State of Maryland is the real party in interest, MDIF filed a motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs' claims.
In addressing the defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court
distinguished between MDIF's function as insurer and MDIF's function as
receiver. The district court noted that, to the extent that MDIF functioned
as Community's receiver, MDIF did not operate as an arm of the State in
its relationship to Community. The district court further noted that MDIF's
capacity as an insurer of Community's deposits gave MDIF a claim against
Community's assets. The district court also recognized that an adverse
judgment against Community would deplete the assets available for MDIF
to use to satisfy insurance claims against Community. However, the district
court concluded that the potential depletion of assets available to satisfy
insurance claims does not constitute the direct depletion of state treasury
funds necessary to implicate the eleventh amendment bar against suing the
state. The district court consequently denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss.
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Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion to amend the court's order
for the purpose of certifying an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
section 1292(b) (1986). The district court denied the defendants' motion to
amend. Nonetheless, even though the district court did not enter final
judgment or certify its order for final appeal, the defendants appealed the
district court's refusal to grant a motion to dismiss. The defendants argued
on appeal that, because the eleventh amendment precludes parties from
suing a sovereign state or its operating agencies, the plaintiffs cannot sue a
savings and loan such as Community for which a state agency such as
MDIF acts as receiver.
In considering the defendants' appeal the Fourth Circuit initially addressed whether the case at bar fell within a narrow exception to the final
judgment rule, which exception the United States Supreme Court articulated
in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The
Fourth Circuit noted that even though a district court has not certified its
order for an interlocutory appeal, under Cohen and its progeny an appellate
court may review an issue if the trial court decides the conclusive issue of
the case; if the trial court decides an important collateral matter independent
of the litigation's primary issue; if the trial court's decision precludes
reviewability subsequent to a final judgment; or if the urgency of the matter
necessitates a ruling prior to the final judgment and presents a meritorious,
disputed question upon appeal. In Foremost Guaranty the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the district court's decision on the eleventh amendment issue
fit within the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit allowed the defendants' interlocutory appeal.
Having determined that the defendants were entitled to an interlocutory
appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the district court erred in
refusing to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss. In considering the
defendants' eleventh amendment claim, the Fourth Circuit narrowed the
issue to a question of whether, by suing a savings and loan for which a
state agency acts as receiver, the plaintiffs in fact were suing the state. To
determine whether the state was a party in interest, the Fourth Circuit used
a test that the United States Supreme Court outlined in Dugan v. Rank,
372 U.S. 609 (1963). The Fourth Circuit noted that under the Dugan
rationale a state qualifies as a real party in interest only if an adverse
judgment against the state requires the state to satisfy any potential judgment
with public funds, or if the adverse judgment affects, disrupts, or restrains
the daily functioning of the state government.
Applying the Dugan test to the circumstances in Foremost Guaranty,
the Fourth Circuit examined the relationship between MDIF and the State.
The Fourth Circuit noted that, because the plaintiffs had not alleged
wrongdoing by, or requested relief from, MDIF, the state agency was
involved in the suit solely as Community's receiver. Consequently, the
appellate court recognized that any adverse judgment against Community,
while reducing the assets available for MDIF to distribute upon liquidation,
would not interfere with the State's administration of public funds. Further,
the Fourth Circuit noted that rescission of the mortgage guaranty insurance
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policies subsequently might increase MDIF's exposure as an insurer of
deposits. However, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, because rescission of
the insurance policies would not necessarily result in distribution of stateappropriated funds, liability to the State would remain too indirect and
speculative to implicate the eleventh amendment. Because the plaintiffs' suit
against Community did not interfere with MDIF's administration of public
funds and posed only indirect and collateral liability on the State, under
the Dugan test the defendants failed to establish that the State of Maryland
was a party to the suit. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
MDIF failed' to prove that the protections of the eleventh amendment apply
when an agency acts merely as a conservator. Consequently, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion to
dismiss.
In Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws,
878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth Circuit considered whether Maryland's requirement that nonindigent write-in candidates for certain public
offices file a certificate of candidacy and pay a filing fee to become
"official" candidates violates the first and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution. Reba Williams Dixon and Dana Burroughs
campaigned in the 1987 Baltimore City elections for the offices, respectively,
of Mayor of Baltimore and President of the Baltimore City Council. The
Maryland Election Code, MD. ELECTION CODE ANN. sections 1-1(a)(20),
4A-6, 4D-l, 17-5 (1986), requires that to gain official status write-in candidates must file certificates of candidacy with the state and pay the same
filing fees as required of candidates whose names appear on the ballot. The
state may waive the $150 filing fee if the candidate demonstrates an inability
to pay. Should a prospective write-in candidate fail to pay the filing fee or
to petition for indigent status, the state will exclude the candidate's name
from the official list of candidates that Maryland disseminates to the public,
and the state will not report publicly after the election the number of votes
that the write-in candidates received. Dixon and Burroughs sought to run
as write-in candidates, but refused to pay the required filing fees or to
petition the Board for permission to file as indigent candidates as required
by law. The Board consequently rejected Dixon's and Burroughs's certificates of candidacy.
Dixon and Burroughs immediately instituted a challenge to the constitutionality of the Maryland law in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland. Dixon and Burroughs claimed that Maryland's imposition of a filing fee and refusal to report the votes that nonofficial writein candidates received violate the first and fourteenth amendments. Two
residents of Baltimore who cast votes for Dixon and Burroughs, Edwin B.
Fruit and Margaret Mary Kreiner, joined Dixon and Burroughs as plaintiffs
in the challenge.
In addressing the plaintiffs' claims, the district court only considered
whether the Maryland law violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The district court upheld the Maryland law under
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the equal protection clause because the court found that the $150 write-in
filing fee does not impose a significant burden on candidates or voters and
that Maryland's interests in defraying the cost of write-in candidacies and
discouraging frivolous candidacies provide a rational basis for the Maryland
law. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's ruling to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
In evaluating the plaintiffs' challenge, the Fourth Circuit first noted
that, while legislative restrictions on candidates for public office may infringe
upon the constitutional rights of the candidates themselves, such restrictions
also may violate voters' first amendment right of association and the
fundamental right to vote. In addition, the Fourth Circuit expressed dissatisfaction with the equal protection analysis the district court used that
emphasized the effect of the restrictions upon the candidate rather than
upon the voter. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit abandoned the equal
protection analysis the district court used when examining the constitutionality of legislative restrictions on candidacy.
The Fourth Circuit adopted a two-part test under the first and fourteenth
amendments that does not require a separate analysis under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Fourth Circuit's analysis
focused on the impact of the challenged laws upon the voters' constitutional
rights rather than upon the candidates' rights. Under this test, when evaluating a constitutional challenge to a state's elections laws, the reviewing
court first must examine the character and magnitude of the asserted injury
to the rights protected by the first and fourteenth amendments that the
plaintiff voter seeks to vindicate. Second, the court must identify and
evaluate the legitimacy and strength of the interests the state has put forward
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In examining the state's
interests, the court must consider the extent to which the state's interests
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights and determine whether
the challenged law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
The Fourth Circuit thus began its analysis of the plaintiffs' challenge
by considering the character and magnitude of the injury to the plaintiffs'
first amendment right of association that Maryland's write-in filing fee
requirement imposed. The Fourth Circuit found that Maryland's denial of
official status to uncertified write-in candidates deprives the candidates and
their supporters of the intangible benefits that a political campaign derives
from the "official" designation. The court found, however, that the magnitude of this injury was not substantial, as Dixon and Burroughs were able
to campaign vigorously regardless of their unofficial status.
The Fourth Circuit next evaluated the character and magnitude of the
injury that Maryland's refusal to report publicly the number of votes cast
for uncertified write-in candidates caused to the plaintiff voters' fundamental
right to cast an effective vote. According to the court, the ability to cast a
write-in ballot for a candidate, particularly a candidate who represents an
unpopular or minority view, is an important avenue of dissident expression.
Because most write-in candidates represent unpopular or minority views
and, therefore, stand little chance of winning, the expressive quality of
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write-in votes depends in large part upon the public reporting of the number
of write-in ballots cast. Refusing to make public the number of votes a
candidate has garnered because of a failure to pay a filing fee, according
to the court, is tantamount to preventing voters from casting their votes
for a particular candidate altogether. Consequently, the court found that
the Maryland law imposed an injury of great magnitude to the voters' right
to cast an effective vote.
After concluding that the Maryland filing fee requirement infringed
upon the voters' first amendment right of association and right to cast an
effective vote, the Fourth Circuit examined the interests that the State of
Maryland asserted in justification of the challenged requirements. First,
Maryland argued that the filing fee required of nonindigent write-in candidates was intended to help defray the cost of write-in candidacies. The
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that states may require election candidates to
pay fees only in certain limited circumstances. According to the court, the
state may require the candidate to bear only those expenses that arise as a
result of that candidate's decision to enter the race. The state, however,
must bear expenses attributable to the legislature's decision to hold the
election. The court found that the State of Maryland failed to prove that
it calculated the $150 fee to cover only those election expenses chargeable
to the candidates. Accordingly, the court held Maryland's interest in defraying election expenses insufficient to justify the filing fee's burden upon
the voters' first amendment associational rights and right to cast an effective
vote.
The Fourth Circuit next examined Maryland's claim that its interest in
preventing fraudulent and frivolous candidacies and the resulting potential
for voter confusion justifies the imposition of a filing fee with respect to
write-in candidates. While the court acknowledged that ensuring the legitimacy and seriousness of candidates for public office may in some circumstances constitute a legitimate state objective, the court held that the
imposition of a filing fee is a wholly ineffective and impermissible means
of accomplishing that potentially legitimate goal. According to the court,
Maryland's filing fee is both over- and under-inclusive in discouraging
frivolous candidates in that it fails to bar both wealthy frivolous candidates,
who can afford the fee, and indigent frivolous candidates, who need not
pay the fee. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held Maryland's write-in
candidate filing fee requirement insufficiently narrowly tailored to Maryland's regulatory interest in light of the burden the requirement places on
the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
After holding the filing fee requirement unconstitutional, the Fourth
Circuit turned to the question of the constitutionality of Maryland's refusal
to report publicly the number of votes cast for anyone other than official,
state-certified candidates. The court first held that Maryland's economic
interests could not justify its refusal to report votes cast for uncertified
candidates. According to the court, under the current system Maryland
election authorities count all write-in votes as a matter of course. The
counting and reporting of votes of uncertified candidates thus is an expense
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resulting from the legislature's decision to hold an election rather than from
the candidates' decision to enter the race. Consequently, the court found
that Maryland must bear the expense of counting the write-in votes.
The court next held that the State's interest in preventing frivolous
candidacies or the reporting of write-in votes cast for fictitious personages
was likewise insufficient to justify Maryland's refusal to report such votes.
As the court stressed throughout its opinion, write-in candidacies have great
value as avenues for dissident expression, and votes cast even for noncandidates or fictitious persons may have value as the voter's statement of
dissatisfaction with all of the candidates on the ballot. To refuse to report
these votes as a penalty for failure to pay a filing fee or failure to obtain
state certification unacceptably burdens the rights of voters. Consequently,
the court emphasized that, while drafting a constitutionally valid pre-election
certification requirement or filing fee may be possible, under no circumstances will such requirements be valid as conditions to the post-election
reporting of votes cast for a candidate.
In Collins v. City of Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth
Circuit considered whether the at-large system of voting for the city council
in Norfolk, Virginia, violates the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A.
sections 1973-1973bb-1 (1965), by interfering with the plaintiffs' right to
elect a pro rata share of councilmembers. In Collins the plaintiffs, seven
black citizens of Norfolk and the Norfolk Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, alleged that the at-large
system of voting, aggravated by staggered terms, diluted the voting strength
of black citizens. Plaintiffs supported their allegation with reference to a
historical lack of a minority presence on the city council. Plaintiffs stated
that until 1968 the seven-member council consisted of all white members.
From 1968 to 1977, one black member served on the council. Upon
resignation of the only black councilmember in 1977, the mayor appointed
another black candidate whom the city subsequently re-elected to serve three
consecutive four year terms. Not until after the plaintiffs commenced this
action did an additional black member serve on the city council, marking
the first time that two black members simultaneously have served on the
city council. Plaintiffs alleged that, because the city's population is thirtyfive percent black and the black population has a high rate of participation
in the electoral process, the inability of the black population to elect more
than one councilmember at a time is a result of Norfolk's at-large voting
system.
According to plaintiffs, the inability to elect "representatives of their
choice" violates the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by using race or color to
deny black citizens of Norfolk the right to vote. Plaintiffs further alleged
that, although two black members simultaneously have sat on the council
since 1984, their simultaneous election can be attributed only to special
circumstances rather than to a voting scheme which complies with the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Consequently, plaintiffs sought to eliminate the
at-large system of voting to allow plaintiffs to elect representatives of their
choice.
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In response to plaintiffs' claim, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia entered judgment for the city, Collins v. City
of Norfolk, 605 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Va. 1984) (Collins 1), and the Fourth
Circuit affirmed in Collins II, 768 F.2d 572 (4th Cir. 1985). However, the
United States Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment in
Collins 111, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), and remanded to the Fourth Circuit for
consideration in light of Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). In
Collins IV, 816 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1987), the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. After
remand the district court entered judgment for the city in Collins V, 679
F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Va. 1988).
In Collins V the district court applied the Gingles three-pronged test
utilized if at-large voting is alleged to dilute votes in violation of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. According to the Gingles test plaintiffs must prove
three facts. First, the plaintiffs must show that the black minority is
adequately large and geographically condensed so as to comprise a majority
in a single member district. Second, the plaintiffs must show that the black
minority politically is cohesive. Third, the plaintiffs must show that the
white majority consistently votes as a bloc, enabling the majority to prevail
over the minority's preferred candidate.
In applying the Gingles test the district court determined that the
plaintiffs sufficiently proved the first two elements of their cause of action
by proving that Norfolk's black population is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in two districts, and that
Norfolk's black population politically is cohesive enough to satisfy the
second prong of Gingles. However, the district court reasoned that the
statutory term "representatives of their choice" included all candidates who
received greater than fifty percent of the black vote, regardless of whether
an unsuccessful candidate received a higher percentage of the black vote.
By reference to the election of candidates who received a majority of the
black vote, yet not the highest percentage of black votes, and the election
of a second simultaneous black councilmember in 1984, the district court
concluded that no indications of racial-bloc voting existed in Norfolk city
council elections. Thus, the district court found that, because the plaintiffs
failed to prove that the white majority engages in racial-bloc voting, the
plaintiffs failed the third prong of the Gingles test. Accordingly, the district
court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the at-large voting scheme
dilutes the voting strength of the black minority enough to constitute a
violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court both erroneously
identified the minority's preferred representatives and erroneously attributed
inordinate importance to the election of a second black councilmember in
1984. As a result, the plaintiffs claimed that the district court erroneously
failed to find legally significant white bloc voting necessary to meet the
third prong of the Gingles test. In considering plaintiffs' appeal the Fourth
Circuit analyzed the district court's application of the Gingles test to
Norfolk's at-large voting system. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district
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court's finding that the plaintiffs satisfied the first two prongs of the test
by showing the ability of the minority group to comprise a majority in a
single member district and the ability of the minority group to be politically
cohesive.
However, contrary to the district court's findings, the Fourth Circuit
found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the third prong of the Gingles test.
In finding white bloc voting sufficient to satisfy the third prong, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the district court misconstrued the statutory definition
of the minority's "representatives of choice." The Fourth Circuit noted
that the district court defined the minority's preferred candidates as any
successful candidate who received greater than fifty percent of the minority
vote. However, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, with at-large voting in
multimember district races, a successful candidate who received a majority
of the minority vote cannot be deemed the minority's preferred representative if another candidate received an even higher percentage of the minority
vote, yet lost the election because not enough of the white majority voted
for him or her.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that a successful candidate who
does not receive the highest percentage of minority votes cast is presumed
not to be the minority's representative of choice. In reversing the district
court's definition as an erroneous construction of "preferred candidates,"
the Fourth Circuit relied on testimony of candidates who fit within the
district court's definition yet did not consider themselves to be representative
of the minority position. Therefore, because the city did not effectively
rebut the presumption that these candidates are not representative of the
minority group, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had proved
that racially polarized voting existed in city council elections.
After determining that racially polarized voting existed, the Fourth
Circuit considered whether the election of a second minority councilmember
in 1984 and 1988, after the plaintiffs commenced this action, negated the
existence of racially polarized voting. Contrary to the district court's findings, the Fourth Circuit attributed the success of the second councilmember
to unusual voting patterns by the white majority. More specifically, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the white majority group intended to moot
plaintiffs' action by endorsing a second minority candidate in lieu of their
own candidate-an action that the majority group never before had taken.
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit concluded that, because special circumstances existed, the simultaneous election of two black candidates after
plaintiffs had commenced this action did not negate the existence of racially
polarized voting.
Accordingly, because the Fourth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs
had satisfied the Gingles three-pronged test, the Fourth Circuit held that
Norfolk's at-large voting system violated the plaintiffs' rights under the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 to elect representatives of their choice. Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded for
further proceedings. Upon remand, the Fourth Circuit directed that the
district court should enjoin at-large elections for the Norfolk city council,

